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Conceptual Origins
From the very beginning the governments that
established UNCTAD undertook a commitment 'to
lay the foundations of a better world economic order'
[UNCTAD 1964:para 9]. They recognised that
'international trade is an important instrument for
economic development' [UNCTAD l964:para 53]. In
view of the importance attached to these basic ideas by
those who were most active in creating the new
institution, it is natural to begin by examining their
origins and the character of the new departure that
they represented.
The conventional wisdom about international trade,
then as now, was grounded in neoclassical political
economy, which asserted that spontaneous market
forces were always tending towards a benevolent
equilibrium, and that any departures from this
equilibrium would inevitably set in motion a self-
correcting process of adjustment. Moreover, full
employment, economic growth and the optimum
utilisation of resources were assured.
The first major challenge to neoclassical political
economy was that of the Keynesian school in the
1930s, which showed that cyclical fluctuations in the
level of output and employment were inherent in the
system. Since spontaneous forces could not be relied
on to eliminate the ups and downs of the trade cycle, it
was incumbent on governments to provide the
economic management needed to maintain full
employment at all times. At the San Francisco and
Bretton Woods conferences governments expressed
their determination to avoid a return to the conditions
that had brought about the Great Depression of the
1930s. Accordingly, the charters of the United Nations
and of the International Monetary Fund embodied a
commitment to the full employment objective.
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There was no corresponding enlightenment or
freshness of outlook with respect to world trade. In
this area the old neoclassical precepts continued to
prevail. Whatever happened in world trade had to
happen by virtue of an international division of labour
that was as inescapable as it was just.
The prevailing view in the first post-war decade was
that if governments would only renounce the
manipulation of exchange rates and dismantle the
restrictions on trade and payments left over from the
depression and the war, market incentives would be
set free and would operate in such a way as to ensure
the specialisation of all countries along the lines best
calculated to promote their development, based on the
principle of comparative advantage. Indeed, the
spontaneous forces in the system could be relied upon,
in the long run, to bring about not only universal
development but the progressive equalisation of
incomes worldwide, so that inequities in the
intercountry distribution of income would disappear
of their own accord. Thus while the attainment of full
employment called for government intervention in the
economy where needed, in international trade and
payments the objective was in exactly the opposite
direction.
To this vision of the world economy there emerged,
soon after the end of World War II, a centre of strong
opposition. This was located not in an academic
institution, as the Keynesian school had been, but in
the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin
America (ECLA), headed by Raúl Prebisch, who was
later to become the first Secretary-General of
UNCTAD. Prebisch confronted the conventional
wisdom head on. So far from there being any
spontaneous tendency towards a worldwide levelling
of incomes, he showed that the forces tending towards
the continuous polarisation of economies, both
internally and externally, were far stronger than those
tending towards equilibrium. He demonstrated that if
these cumulative forces of the world economy were
not countered by deliberate action at the national and
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international level, the economic distance between
rich and poor would grow even wider.
The power of initiative and change rested with the
industrial countries at the centre of the world economy
while the less developed countries at the periphery
merely responded passively to the stimuli generated at
the centre. The hegemony of the centre was, moreover,
manifested both in the composition of its trade with
the periphery and in the terms on which that trade
took place.
The composition of trade was a survival of the old
colonial order under which the metropolitan powers
exported manufactures to their dependencies in
exchange for imports of foodstuffs and raw materials.
This pattern of specialisation was promoted and
preserved by the tariff structure of the industrial
centres: while primary products were generally
admitted duty free or at a low rate of duty, tariffs on
manufactured imports were deliberately set to
increase progressively with their degree of manu-
facture. This relic of mercantilism had survived into
modern times.
Structural rigidity in the composition of trade between
the centre and the periphery had major implications
for the growth and terms of trade. In the first place
world demand for primary commodities tended to
increase much more slowly than for manufactures.
This was due partly to the fact that advances in real
income were generally associated with relatively
slower increases in the demand for foodstuffs and
other staple consumer goods and a shift in demand
towards industrial goods and services. Moreover,
technical progress was constantly tending to reduce
the raw material content of final output by making it
possible to ecomomise on the use of raw materials as
well as by increasing the degree of fabrication of
finished products. The development of synthetic
products in the industrial countries further reduced
the requirements of these countries for imports of
natural materials from developing countries. Finally,
the industrialisation of agriculture in the developed
countries made it possible for them to do without a
number of the agricultural products previously
imported from developing countries.
The Terms of Trade
Coupled with the above trends was a tendency for the
terms of trade of developing countries to deteriorate
over time owing to declines in the prices of the primary
commodities exported by them in relation to the prices
of the manufactures that they imported from the
industrial countries. Of the entire body of thinking
developed by Prebisch and the ECLA school, this
particular proposition was probably the most
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controversial, and became the subject of an extensive
literature.
This is not the place for an in-depth review of the
debate on the unequal terms of exchange, as it has
been called. In part, the critics misunderstood what
Prebisch was saying. As he pointed out in his report to
UNCTAD J,2 the terms of trade thesis 'should not be
regarded as an immutable law'. Indeed, Prebisch
pointed to the circumstances in which the inherent
tendency towards deterioration might be offset or
even reversed.
Consequently, much of the controversy about the
historical trends was beside the point. Since Prebisch
was not arguing that relative declines in the prices of
primary products would take place under any and all
conditions, but only that there was a tendenct for this
to occur in the absence of countervailing forces, it was
not necessary for him to show that historical trends
had invariably been in that direction.
It is true that in the course of his original exposition of
the thesis in 1950, he cited data that indicated a long-
run improvement in United Kingdom terms of trade
from 1876-80 to 1946-47. Since UK imports consisted
predominantly of primary commodities while its
exports were mainly manufactures, he drew the
conclusion that developing country exporters of
primary commodities had suffered a symmetrical
deterioration in their terms of trade. This reasoning
has been criticised in the literature on various
technical grounds, some valid, some invalid. It should,
however, be borne in mind that the statistïcal evidence
available to Prebisch in 1950 was extremely limited,
and any alternative series that he might have used at
that time would have been at least equally open to
criticism.
More important, however, is the fact that empirical
results for any period, however well based in statistical
terms, could yield only suggestive and not conclusive
evidence. The perceived trend in the statistics for any
particular period should, properly speaking, be the
starting point for further analysis of a/i the various
factors involved, including both the inherent factors
emphasised by Prebisch and the countervailing factors
- if any.
It is therefore the analytical case that must be decisive,
and here there can be little doubt that the general
proposition advanced by Prebisch has been vindicated.
As recently demonstrated by Professor Spraos, [1983]
rigorous analysis of the Prebisch thesis, reinterpreted
as relating to the double factorial terms of trade,
shows that 'the exchange of primary exports against
The term UNCTA D t i used to denote the t rst U n ted Nations
Conference on Trade and Development.
manufactured imports has been conducive to making
growth incrementally inequalising for developing
market economies'. This conclusion emerges quite
simply from the fact of the low income and price
elasticity of demand for the primary commodities
principally exported by the developing countries. It is
reinforced by the fact that while technical progress in
the manufacturing industries of developed countries
usually generates higher real wages and profits for the
producers, corresponding advances in the technology
of primary production tend to be passed on to
consumers in the form of (relatively) lower prices.
Adverse Trends in World Trade
At the level of international economic diplomacy, the
most important factor in the convening of UNCTAD I
was the progressively deteriorating situation of
developing countries in world trade in the course of
the 1950s and early 1960s. The contribution of the
'ECLA doctrine', as it came to be called, was that it
was able to show that the adverse trends were not
casual or accidental, but were deeply ingrained in the
world trading system itself. While world trade as a
whole more than doubled from 1950 to the early
1960s, exports of developing countries rose by only
half. As a result, the share of developing countries in
world trade declined steadily from nearly one-third in
1950 to only slightly more than one-fifth immediately
before the Conference. The developing countries lost
ground even in world trade in primary products in
which they were believed to have a comparative
advantage. Thus the share of developing countries in
world exports of primary commodities other than
petroleum declined from 41 per cent in 1950 to less
than 30 per cent in the early 1960s.
Some of the inherent factors tending towards this
outcome have already been rientioned - notably the
lower income elasticity of world demand for primary
products exported by developing countries than for
manufactures, exported mainly by developed countries,
and differences in market structure as between the two
product groups. But there were additional factors
tending in the same direction. Prominent among these
were the restrictions on imports of primary
commodities imposed by industrial countries, parti-
cularly in connection with agricultural support
programmes. At the same time, the developing
countries made little headway in manufactures: in fact
their share in world exports of these goods was also
declining. The main factor in this decline was the
recovery in the export capacity for manufactures that
had taken place in Western Europe and Japan, which
was only to be expected. The developing countries
were, however, concerned about various obstacles to
their export trade in manufactures. In addition to
maintaining the old colonial tariff structure, as noted
earlier, the developed countries were beginning to take
even more stringent measures against manufactured
imports from developing countries, particularly
cotton textiles.
In 1962 the developing countries found themselves
compelled to enter into an international arrangement
for the restriction of cotton textile exports to the
industrial countries under the threat that in the
absence of such an arrangement the latter countries
would impose even more severe import controls. This
new development was clearly an ominous one, giving
rise to the fear among developing countries that any
success they might achieve in diversifying their exports
into the field of manufactures would quickly meet with
strong and discriminatory resistance from the
developed countries.
These various obstacles to the growth of exports of
developing countries were compounded by a
deterioration in their terms of trade: between 1950 and
1961, for example, the terms of trade of developing
countries deteriorated by some 17 per cent. One did
not have to accept the theory of unequal exchange to
see that the persistence of this trend would cause
mounting difficulties for the developing countries.
The Trade Gap
It was not surprising in these circumstances that the
export earnings of the developing countries should
have been increasing much less rapidly than their
import requirements. The issue of the 'trade gap' of
developing countries, and the consequential foreign
exchange constraint on their development, was
dramatised forcefully by the Conference and placed
firmly in the centre of international economic
discussion.
In launching the first United Nations Development
Decade in 1961 with the strong support of President
Kennedy and other leaders of industrial countries, the
General Assembly of the United Nations had adopted
the target of a minimum annual rate of growth of five
per cent in the real income of less developed countries
by 1970. This rate of growth was certainly not an
inordinately ambitious one, and was not, in fact, much
higher than the average rate of 4.4 per cent per annum
recorded in the 1950s. In view of rapid rates of
population increase, the target rate of growth of five
per cent per annum corresponded to an annual rate of
expansion of little more than two and a half per cent in
the average per capita income of the developing
countries. For the poorer countries that accounted for
about half of the population of the less developed
areas, such a rate of growth implied that the period
required to reach contemporary Western European
living standards would be of the order of two hundred
years.
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The report of the Secretary-General of the Conference
to UNCTAD I drew attention to the foreign trade
implications of this minimal five per cent growth
target. On the basis of past experience, an overall
growth rate of five per cent per annum would
necessitate a rate of increase of import volume of not
less than six per cent per annum. One of the main
reasons for this was that any acceleration in the rate of
growth would necessitate additional investment, and
the import content of such investment was normally
much higher than that of income as a whole because
developing countries had relatively little capacity for
production of machinery and equipment.
On the other hand, the volume of exports of
developing countries had been increasing at a rate of
only four per cent per annum during the 1950s, and if
petroleum exporting countries were excluded the rate
was even lower. At the same time, the effect of the
deterioration in terms of trade was that the purchasing
power of exports over imports rose more slowly still,
by under two per cent per annum.
This, then, was the basis for the 'trade gap' of
developing countries. Even at existing rates of growth
there was a widening gap in the balance of payments of
developing countries. At higher rates of growth
consistent with the quite modest objectives of the
Development Decade, the gap would be magnified
accordingly. It was estimated that if current trends in
world trade continued, the trade gap of developing
countries would be likely to reach an order of
magnitude of about $20 bn by 1970, a daunting figure
at the dollar prices prevailing in the early 1960s.
Projections of this type have since become common-
place, and are now carried out regularly not only by
research departments of the United Nations but also
by those of other international agencies such as the
IMF, the World Bank and the OECD. At the time of
UNCTAD t, however, the idea of a quantifiable
foreign exchange constraint on growth created fierce
controversy. Strong intellectual artillery was mounted
against the idea of a trade gap on the basis of a variety
of arguments ranging from fundamental criticism of
the concept itself to scepticism about the statistical
techniques employed.
There was, of course, room for honest differences of
opinion as to the precise magnitude of the 'trade gap'.
Being a residual, the gap between projected exports
and imports was necessarily sensitive to the underlying
assumptions made about the functional relationships
between trade and growth in both developed and
developing countries. But it could hardly be doubted
that there was a gap, and that it was tending to
increase. This was obvious from the fact that the
volume of exports of developing countries was tending
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to rise more slowly than the volume of imports. This
factor alone indicated a growing trade gap even if
there was no further deterioration in terms of trade.
Closing the Trade Gap
What was important was not the precise magnitude of
the 'trade gap' that had been projected, but the basic
tendency that it indicated. It pointed clearly to the
character of the measures that would be needed if the
General Assembly's target rate of growth were to be
realised. Either the 'gap' would have to be bridged by a
suitable expansion of trade or aid, or the developing
countries would have to effect a fundamental
reorientation of their foreign trade pattern and
possibly of their domestic economic policies as well.
The only other alternative was a reduction in overall
growth rates by the developing countries to the point
at which their imports would rise no faster than the
current slow rate of expansion of their exports - and
this would mean the collapse of any hope for
attainment of the General Assembly's objectives.
Part of the opposition to the 'trade gap' analysis was
based on concern in the developed countries that it
was intended thereby to establish a case for $20 bn of
additional aid annually. It is quite clear, however, that
this was not Prebisch's intention. His main objective
was to obtain acceptance of the proposition that the
trade and aid objectives of the international
community must be consistent with its growth
objectives. Such consistency could, however, be
achieved in various ways. Addressing the Federal
German Society for Foreign Policy in Bonn in June
1965, for example, Prebisch said: 'Allow us to export
that much more and we will be a ready market for an
additional $20 bn worth of your industrial products
per year'. A few days earlier he had told the Canadian
Manufacturers' Association in Toronto that 'the
fundamental long-term solution [to the problem of the
trade gapi lies in trade - by increasing the possibilities
of the developing countries to export more, so that
they can import more'. Aid, he said, could only be a
temporary measure, though it might have to continue
for some time for countries at a very low level of
development.
Convergent Measures
How could such a transformation of the trade
prospects of developing countries be accomplished?
The answer lay in a programme of what Prebisch
called 'convergent measures' - mutually supporting
measures by both developing and developed countries.
Great efforts by the developing countries themselves
were indispensable - 'the policy of international
cooperation is only complementary, it cannot be a
substitute for internal development policy' [Prebisch
1964:113]. In particular, effective steps would have to
be taken to deal with the three main obstacles to the
growth of productivity and per capita income in
developing countries: land tenure; limited social
mobility and the ignorance of the masses; and the
concentration of income in the hands of relatively
small population groups [Prebisch 1964].
Prebisch was also very much aware of the cul de sac
that Latin American countries had got themselves into
by pursuing policies of what he called 'inward-looking
industrial growth, regardless of the outer world'. He
considered that 'the countries now embarking upon
industrialisation should be warned against the grave
mistakes we have made in Latin America because we
were unable, within the framework of world
production and trade, to start exporting manufactured
goods at the very outset of our industrialisation
process' [Prebisch 1963].
But if developing countries were to be encouraged to
adopt more outward-looking policies, the inter-
national community must be ready to accept the
implications for world trade and make room for the
additional exports involved. 'It is no good', said
Prebisch, 'to preach the need for [developing
countries] to develop by their own efforts and at the
same time to limit their possibilities of giving practical
expression to that effort in the international field
through the expansion of their exports. They must not
be forced into a kind of closed development' [Prebisch
1964:124].
Commodity Stabilisation
Since the unregulated operation of market forces had
been tending to bring about perverse transfers of real
income from the poor countries to the rich, there was a
strong case for corrective international action to
counterbalance this process. Such action could take
the form of internationally agreed measures to
stabilise trade in basic commodities at a reasonable
level of prices, and to promote the diversification of
exports of developing countries so as to include a
progressively growing proportion of manufactured
products.
The industrial countries were aware, from their own
experience, of the serious problems of domestic
income distribution resulting from the chronic
weakness of agricultural prices, and the consequent
persistent tendency for the internal terms of trade to
move against the agricultural producers. It was for this
reason that they had taken a variety of steps to support
domestic agricultural prices or incomes through
deliberate government regulation of commodity
markets or provision of income supplements to
farmers. They were nevertheless opposed to inter-
national intervention in commodity markets. While
their opposition could be understood in terms of their
short-term interests, it was less clear that it was
rational in a longer run perspective, since rising real
income in the developing countries was clearly in
harmony with the interests of the developed countries
from many points of view, including the larger
markets for their exports that a prosperous Third
World would imply. In fact, however, the policies of
the industrial countries on agricultural production
and trade had a doubly adverse effect on the
developing countries. While their laissez-faire policies
at the international level prevented the adoption of
agreements to stabilise international commodity
prices, their close regulation of internal agricultural
markets created a stimulus to domestic producers and
an additional obstacle to exporters in developing
countries.
It was therefore not sufficient to expand the number
and increase the effectiveness of international
commodity agreements. It was also important to
improve the access of primary commodities produced
in developing countries to the markets of the industrial
countries. Barriers to imports of such products should
be progressively reduced and ultimately eliminated.
Export Diversification
But the real solution to the problem of insufficient
growth of exports from developing countries lay in
diversification of exports, particularly into the field of
manufactures. Here there was a need for preferential
treatment for the manufactured exports of developing
countries in the markets of developed countries. The
case for such preferences was that they could help in
overcoming the initial difficulties and high costs of
breaking into highly competitive markets in which
established large-scale industries in the developed
countries had an overwhelming advantage. In other
words, the case for preferences was a logical extension
of the generally accepted argument for the protection
of infant industries through import tariffs. In fact if
infant industries needed protection in the domestic
markets of developing countries because of their
initially high costs of production, they obviously
needed even more protection in foreign markets,
whether developed or developing, in the form of
preferential treatment.
Industrial growth in the developing countries could
also be accelerated through concerted action within
regional groupings of these countries, thereby
increasing the scope for efficient import substitution
by bringing into play the benefits of specialisation,
competition and economies of scale.
11
These were among the main features of a new world
trade policy that would make a significant positive
contribution to world development instead of creating
obstacles to that development, as had too often been
the case in the past.
The Role of Trade in Development
One of the major achievements of UNCTAD I was its
acceptance, in principle, of the importance of trade as
an engine of development. The very first paragraph of
the Final Act of the Conference states that 'In an age
when scientific progress has put unprecedented
abundance within man's reach, it is essential that the
flows of world trade should help to eliminate the wide
economic disparities among nations'. That declaration
reflected a new concept of international trade. As
noted earlier, world trade had hitherto been viewed as
he spontaneous and benevolent result of the
peration of market forces. International action
should therefore be limited to the creation of the freest
possible environment for trade and payments, so that
the beneficial effects of market forces could be
maximised.
Now, however, it was gradually coming to be
understood that international trade could and should
be shaped to the goals of international policy. The
Conference thereby marked a turning point in
attitudes to the role and possibilities of international
trade in promoting development in all countries, and
especially in developing countries. The extent of the
change should not, of course, be exaggerated.
Whatever the texts agreed to at UNCTAD I may have
contained, it certainly cannot be said that they
embodied international agreement on the specific
steps needed to promote development through trade.
Indeed even today, a generation later, the battle for
better access for the exports of developing countries to
the markets of industrial countries remains to be won,
and in some respects the protectionism of the latter
countries is even stronger in the 1980s than it was in
the l960s.
Objectives of the Socialist Countries
The socialist countries of Eastern Europe had long
had their own reasons for urging the convening of a
world economic conference devoted particularly to
international trade problems. At the United Nations
General Assembly in 1956, the USSR delegation
proposed that such a conference be convened in the
following year to consider 'a further expansion of
world trade and the establishment of a world trade
organisation within the framework of the United
Nations'.3 A draft resolution calling upon the
Economic and Social Council to consider the idea of a
UN document A/P.V.589, para 125.
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world economic conference was narrowly rejected by
the Assembly's Economic and Financial Committee.4
At frequent intervals thereafter the socialist countries
continued to press their case, and when the developing
countries began their own campaign for a conference
on trade and development in the early 1960s, the two
groups joined forces in furtherance of this objective.
The principal motivation of the socialist countries in
this regard derived from the fact, as they saw it, that
they were subject to trade discrimination by the
OECD countries as well as by many developing
countries. It was true that most of the developed
market economies had granted most favoured nation
tariff treatment to the socialist countries. But the latter
were concerned about cases of continuing tariff
discrimination, and particularly about the EEC and
EFTA programmes of mutual tariff reduction under
their respective customs union and free trade area
arrangements, which the socialist countries regarded
as tantamount to raising barriers to traditional east-
west trade.
They were even more disturbed by the widely
prevalent practice in OECD countries whereby
imports from socialist countries were subject to
quantitative restrictions, and certain exports were
subject to 'strategic' export controls. The socialist
countries were also confronted with varying degrees of
restriction on transferability of the currencies earned
from exports to certain of the developed market
economies. In the light of these considerations, the
primary goals of the socialist countries were the
mutual application by all countries of most favoured
nation treatment in relation to both tariff and non-
tariff restrictions, and a more flexible payments
system. These objectives could not, they felt, be
attained by means of negotiations within the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to which
they had not (except for Czechoslovakia) subscribed.
As they saw it, GATT rules had been drawn up one-
sidedly, reflecting the needs of market economies.
State trading was treated in GATT only from the
limited standpoint of the special conditions obtaining
in a few relatively unimportant sectors of the market
economies themselves. There had been no attempt in
GATT to establish a mutually satisfactory regime for
east-west trade.
The OECD countries, on the other hand, were
concerned about the difficulties of giving any real
meaning to the concept of non-discrimination in the
context of a centrally planned economy. For example,
they considered it virtually impossible for any external
authority to ascertain either the criteria determining
governmental trading plans and policies in the
socialist countries or the methods whereby such
UN document A/C.2/L .319. .A/3545. para 15.
criteria were translated into choices between com-
peting sources of supply made by the agencies
responsible for import decisions. On the other hand
they insisted on the legitimacy of the EEC and EFTA
arrangements insofar as they observed the principles
for such arrangements laid down in GATT.
The socialist countries made common cause with the
developing countries in seeking a world trade
conference, in the hope and expectation that the east-
west trade issues in which they were interested would
find a place on the agenda of the conference as well as
in the work programme of any institution that it might
establish. Prebisch's report to UNCTAD T did in fact
contain a short section on east-west trade. While the
report did not propose any specific solution to the
controversy between the socialist countries and the
developed market economies, it did support efforts to
resolve that controversy. It pointed out, moreoever,
that World trade is an intimately interrelated
network, and the repercussions of obstacles in any one
part are felt inevitably in all the others' Prebisch
1964:92].
The developing countries had no objection to the
discussion of east-west issues in UNCTAD and
supported the socialist countries on the principle that
east-west trade should be normalised. The OECD
countries, however, did not regard UNCTAD as an
appropriate forum for discussion of east-west issues
and preferred to take these issues up in the UN
Economic Commission for Europe. The developing
countries, for their part, saw no reason to press the
OECD countries on this matter. On the contrary, they
feared that prolonged and acrimonious debates on this
subject might divert attention from the questions of
trade and development that they considered of highest
priority. Moreover the exports of socialist countries to
the OECD countries consisted largely of primary
commodities and were therefore, to a considerable
extent, in competition with the exports of developing
countries. The developing countries were therefore
concerned that any expansion of east-west trade
should not be at the expense of developing country
exports.5
Furthermore, developing countries expected the
socialist countries to undertake specific trade and aid
commitments within the framework of their planning
processes. They should, for example, accelerate the
growth of their imports from developing countries,
reduce the differential between the import and
domestic sales prices of commodities purchased from
these countries, grant concessions equivalent to the
preferential arrangements expected of the market
economies, and refrain from re-exporting commodities
imported from developing countries except with the
permission of the latter. These and other requests
addressed to the socialist countries placed them, in
effect, in a position similar to that of the developed
market economies vis-à-vis the Third World, and their
role in UNCTAD gradually evolved accordingly.
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